You Better get a lawyer, sport.
You better get a real sports one to get you out of this one.
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When Integrity Isn’t Enough: What Belooussov v Gymnastics Australia Reveals About Legal Risk in Australian Sport
Lead Consultant, Game Integrity
This article reviews and responds to the Determination of National Sports Tribunal Member Bruce Collins KC as Arbitrator in the case of Olga Belooussov v Gymnastics Australia [2024] NST 331101[1].
TL;DR - As integrity systems mature, the question is no longer whether organisations have policies, but whether those policies — and the decisions made under them — can withstand legal challenge. This requires legal expertise not just at the point of dispute, but at the design, investigation, and decision-making stages.
Introduction
Six years after the establishment of the National Sports Tribunal (NST), and five years on from the launch of the National Integrity Framework (NIF) by Sport Integrity Australia (SIA), Australian sport is entering a more mature — and potentially more legally exposed — integrity era. Having worked in sport integrity for over a decade, including before the launch of the NIF, I have seen how good intentions fail when legal risk is not properly understood and managed.
The December 2025 public reporting of the NST determination in Belooussov v Gymnastics Australia should be read carefully by sporting boards, CEOs, and executives. Not because it undermines the importance of safeguarding or integrity policies — it does not — but because it highlights a growing and under-appreciated risk:
the gap between integrity processes as designed and integrity decisions as legally tested.
This case is not a failure of intent, nor a repudiation of integrity frameworks. It is a warning about what happens when integrity is not properly treated as a legal risk discipline requiring specialist expertise, experience, and knowledge. While it is good governance to know that sport needs integrity, it is better governance to develop, apply, manage, and continually improve integrity systems that are legally sound and supported by organisation wide and deep integrity cultures.
While many sporting organisations have been focused on the price of integrity, Belooussov v Gymnastics Australia also shows the cost of misunderstanding and (ultimately) mismanaging integrity.
The Facts of Belooussov v Gymnastics Australia
The dispute in Belooussov v Gymnastics Australia arose from a complaint made by a former athlete’s parent on behalf of the athlete against Mrs Olga Belooussov, a highly experienced gymnastics coach, alleging conduct that would breach Gymnastics Australia’s Member Protection Policy (MPP) and Child Safeguarding Policy (together, Relevant Policies).
Gymnastics Australia conducted an internal investigation into the allegations. That investigation ultimately distilled the complaint into 12 allegations, of which 7 were found to be substantiated, all characterised as bullying-type conduct under Schedule 1(2) of the MPP. Following the investigation, Gymnastics Australia issued a formal Breach Notice to Mrs Belooussov in June 2024, notifying her of both the findings and the sanctions, which were imposed immediately.
Mrs Belooussov disputed both the findings and the sanctions. Pursuant to Gymnastics Australia’s Complaints, Disputes and Discipline Policy, the matter was referred to the National Sports Tribunal for arbitration. The arbitration was conducted on a de novo basis, meaning the Tribunal was required to consider the matter afresh, with Gymnastics Australia bearing the onus of proving the alleged breaches through evidence presented in the arbitration (rather than relying solely on its prior investigation).
During the arbitration, Gymnastics Australia largely sought to rely on its Investigation Report and prior findings, while Mrs Belooussov challenged the validity, fairness, and evidentiary basis of that report, including whether the requisite standard of proof had been met and whether the sanctions were excessive. Though it made submissions that Mr Belooussov breached each of the Relevant Policies, the Arbitrator determined that each of the original twelve complaints were based upon an allegation of a breach of the bullying provision in the MPP and were not related to a safeguarding matter. The proceeding itself was extensive, involving multiple directions hearings, evidentiary processes, and a full hearing before Member Bruce Collins KC in the NST.
Arbitrator Collins KC found that it was “impossible” to determine that bullying was made out under the MPP and any such conclusion by Gymnastics Australia and its Investigation Committee was “irrational” [151] on the basis that the Investigation Report was “procedurally flawed, sloppy, unfair to Mrs Belooussov and without reasons” [175].
The following analysis sets out my thoughts on the valuable lessons for Australian sporting organisations as to the risks of conducting an integrity investigation, drafting an investigation report, and running a matter in the NST without, as Arbitrator Collins KC put it, “… the basic requirements of natural justice, seasoned perhaps by a little experience and leavened where necessary by the timely addition of a little fundamental legal advice.” [171]
1. Integrity Has Matured — But Legal Risk Has Overtaken It
For as long as any sporting organisation has been established, it has faced integrity threats (external and internal). Over time, sporting organisations have developed a range of policies and codes, complaints pathways, and enforcement forums (often in the form of domestic tribunals) to address these threats. Some sports (often those with better resources) have developed these integrity programs ‘better’ than others. All sporting organisations, no matter the quality or reach of their integrity program, will continue to face threats to the integrity of their sport.
Since the NIF’s introduction by SIA in 2021, most Australian sporting organisations have undergone a sports integrity revolution which not only saw them barter away some of their much-prized autonomy in return for significant regulation, but which also resulted in them investing heavily in nationalised integrity architecture, including:
standardised policies tailored to the sport;
rigorous complaints pathways;
categorisation models;
delegated investigations;
integrity units and National Integrity Managers, and
reporting and funding compliance mechanisms.
All of this must be properly managed.
Further, along with the NIF revolution, the enforcement environment has evolved. Subject to specific arbitration agreements, the NST conducts de novo hearings with legally trained arbitrators, meaning organisations cannot rely solely on internal investigation reports or procedural compliance.
The NST is no longer new or in the extended pilot-phase. It is now a well-used arbitral forum with:
de novo hearings;
clear expectations around evidence; and
legally trained arbitrators applying orthodox principles of proof, procedure, and fairness.
In this environment, the question for boards is no longer: ‘Do we have integrity policies?’
It is: ‘Can the decisions made under those policies withstand independent legal scrutiny?’ If not, why not?
That is a materially different question — and one many sporting organisations may not yet be adequately equipped to answer confidently on their own. In this case, the Arbitrator, the formidable Bruce Collins KC, emphasised the basic fundamental of the arbitration procedure that:
“This arbitration was a hearing de novo which depended upon the evaluation of Gymnastics Australia’s evidence and the responsive evidence from Mrs Belooussov” [14].
This relatively basic procedural step appears to have be continually lost on Gymnastics Australia, including as regards the handling of witnesses, and resulted in delays to proceedings:
“This basic home truth which maps the proceedings did not seem to be clearly understood initially by the Representatives of Gymnastics Australia. … It became necessary for the Arbitrator to state and restate this simple proposition and the failure of Gymnastics Australia to accept that aspect of the procedure initially became something of a clog upon the conduct of the Arbitration” [19].
More generally, the arbitration process was not clearly understood by Gymnastics Australia:
“There is a duty imposed upon any sporting body in the present situation to acquire and apply a properly formed understanding of the process and the consequences of signing the Arbitration Agreement which describes the nature of the Arbitration and the constituent legal steps and the relevant obligation that this would impose upon the sporting body. It was made clear to me on numerous occasions that Gymnastics Australia had not endeavoured to acquire a proper understanding of the practical effect of its having entered into the Arbitration Agreement” [154].
2. Belooussov v Gymnastics Australia: Process, Not Principles
While well-intentioned and stated to be delivered within the context of the findings made by the Australian Human Rights Commission’s 2021 report, ‘Change the Routine’, the Arbitrator found that Gymnastics Australia’s internal processes failed to translate into defensible outcomes at arbitration. Arbitrator Collins KC provides several ‘ Lessons To Be Learned’ [154–170], including:
procedural rigor matters: Evidence must be properly sequenced and witnesses correctly handled;
get legal advice: It is fundamentally important for sporting bodies to take legal advice so that proceedings may be properly conducted;
anonymous witnesses are of low evidentiary value: an anonymous witness may say anything and his or her assertions are for the most part hidden behind the veil of anonymity and beyond the reach of a fully informed cross examination;
respondents have rights: an accused person must be given an opportunity to address on the question of penalty;
investigation reports are not a substitute for evidence: Arbitrators will scrutinise the method of proof; and
de novo arbitration requires legal preparedness: Organisations must anticipate how internal findings will be challenged externally.
Of key concern to Arbitrator Collins KC was various issues with the Investigation Report which Gymnastics Australia attempted to rely upon, including the lack of any reasoning [75]:
“The reader is told nothing concerning the competing versions of the events and how they are to be (or were) resolved”.
In simple terms, what may feel robust and seem fair on a subjective level internally can unravel quickly if it is not legally structured for the relevant processes in the forum of resolution for external challenge.
This is not unique to Gymnastics Australia. It is a systemic issue across many sports. Importantly, Gymnastics Australia has responded constructively, engaging experienced internal legal expertise, perhaps coincidently at the same time as/shortly after the date of Arbitrator Collin’s determination. This demonstrates that the lessons are being actively applied and the board and executive of Gymnastics Australia should be recognised for making this step.
3. The Investigator–Lawyer Divide
One of the most significant — and least openly discussed — issues in Australian sport integrity is who is driving the system. Over the past decade, and more so since the introduction of SIA’s NIF and the roll-out of the National Integrity Manager roles across sport, integrity functions have increasingly been dominated by:
former law enforcement personnel;
investigators;
compliance specialists; and
integrity “consultants” who entered the sector post-NIF implementation.
These professionals often bring valuable skills in:
fact-finding;
interviewing;
risk identification; and
operational process.
But investigation skill is not the same as legal skill. An investigation answers the question: “What likely happened?” A tribunal answers the question: “What has been proven, by whom, and in what way?” The NST is firmly concerned with the latter.
The risk for sporting organisations is assuming that:
a well-run investigation,
a detailed report with sound reasoning given for findings reached and any recommendations made, and
a procedurally compliant internal process
will automatically translate into a defensible outcome in arbitration. Belooussovv Gymnastics Australia demonstrates that this assumption is unsafe.
The NST is concerned with proof, procedure, and fairness, not just operational compliance. Boards need to understand the distinction: investigations identify facts and should question allegations; arbitrations evaluate proof. The two processes must be understood and aligned.
4. Integrity as Legal Risk
Six years into the NST’s operation, several trends are now clear:
integrity disputes are increasingly adversarial;
decisions are being legally challenged, not quietly accepted;
arbitrators are applying orthodox legal principles within the unique context of sport, not sector-specific leniency or subjectiveness from experiences outside of sport; and
reputational, employment, and governance consequences now flow from integrity outcomes.
An example of this is where Arbitrator Collins KC states:
“In the present case I observed clear signs of a lack of objectivity and a flawed determination for Gymnastics Australia to take the unwarranted course it decided it would take rather than an objectively based analysis. [161]
“Perhaps no better example of this approach can be given than the following statements made on behalf of Gymnastics Australia concerning the evidence of the group of gymnasts being referred to as “Princesses”. It was said in an unsolicited intervention by Gymnastics Australia representative that:
‘Mr Collins, I would be very offended if someone said that to me. I think it is derogatory and I have been a police officer for twenty years.’ “[162]
In this environment, integrity can no longer sit comfortably as:
a compliance “tick-the-box” exercise;
a funding-maintenance requirement; or
a siloed operational function operating in layers below the CEO and the board.
Nor can it rely solely on non-lawyer decision-makers once matters escalate.
This does not diminish the importance of culture. In fact, it reinforces it. A genuine integrity culture requires legal robustness, because inconsistent, overturned, or publicly criticised decisions undermine trust far more than no action at all.
Good intentions alone do not equal legally sound outcomes.
5. Boards and CEOs: Compliance vs Culture
From personal experience and from a review of recent NST determinations, a concern that integrity is being framed by some decision makers in sport as compliance, funding protection, or reputational insurance is developing. To the extent that this may be happening in some sports, Belooussovv Gymnastics Australia demonstrates the limits of this ‘tick and flick’ approach. It does so by showing how a compliance culture gets exposed by legal review.
Further, when integrity in sport is framed primarily as:
a compliance obligation;
a funding safeguard; or
a post-incident reputational shield,
it risks becoming performative rather than principled. The irony is this: poorly designed integrity processes can damage broader integrity culture more than they protect it.
Employees, athletes, coaches, and officials may lose confidence when:
outcomes are overturned;
processes are publicly criticised; and
or decisions appear procedurally flawed, even if well-intentioned.
Sponsors, participants, and fans all ‘buy’ a sport’s integrity. When a sport has integrity issues, these stakeholders rightfully raise concerns and may ultimately choose other options when it comes to sport.
The goal of sports integrity programs should be an organisation-wide culture that has a deep understanding of the importance of embedding the protection of integrity within a sport and takes actions to do so in a way that enables and gives effect to proper integrity outcomes led by the right decisions being made by all involved. With sports integrity, the right thing to do is always the right thing to do.
It is simply not good enough for a CEO or a director of a sporting organisation to look at the policies on their website and the number of complaints received and perhaps claim that their sport does not have an integrity problem. This may appear technically correct - they may not have an integrity problem. Until they do. The decisions they make or delegate (and to whom) from the crystallisation of the threat will determine the extent of the “problem”, by which time it may be too late to adequately contain or promptly resolve, even if such action was intended under the policy framework.
With regard to ensuring policies are applied and enforced as designed, Arbitrator Collins KC advised:
“The tale of this investigation does no credit to Gymnastics Australia, nor to the policies it professes to promulgate. The Investigation Report was procedurally flawed, sloppy, unfair to Mrs Belooussov and without reasons. The Report was altogether lacking in analysis, it was not even an exercise in once over lightly. Gymnastics Australia should analyse, critique, re- organise and re-calibrate the whole of its disciplinary structure as to properly give effect to a Policy which has been drafted so as to give effect to the modern necessity to stamp out bullying of all types.” [175].
Boards should be asking harder questions, including:
at what points do lawyers become involved in integrity matters?
are investigations designed with arbitration in mind?
has the investigation report been reviewed by a suitably experienced sports lawyer before any determinations have bene made by the executive?
who is responsible for translating internal findings into legally defensible outcomes?
have our integrity leaders been trained for dispute resolution, not just investigation?
6. The value in engaging a sports lawyer in integrity matters
Arbitrator Collins KC made it very clear to Gymnastics Australia (and all other sporting organisations in Australia) what he considers to be the value for sporting bodies in obtaining a skilled sports lawyer in the administration and application of sports integrity:
“Gymnastics Australia should retain the services of a skilled administration/sports lawyer to revisit, or perhaps visit it for the first time, following subjects from the ground up:
(i) the nature of an arbitration and its procedural features;
(ii) the rules of natural justice and their procedural impact;
(iii) how to properly interview witnesses;
(iv) the obligation to produce documents;
(v) the management of statement makers;
(vi) the unconditional nature of the corporate memory;
(vii) the value of well chosen and economically utilised legal advice;
(viii) the need for a proper legal analysis of the charges;
(ix) balance of probabilities or Briginshaw and why;
(x) how to produce a proper set of reasons;
(xi) the law of privilege.” [176]
For those sporting organisations who do not heed the advice of Arbitrator Collins KC, they may find themselves in a cruel sea of legal review.
7. Timing, Transparency, and Trust
As one final observation; while the determination is dated 20 May 2025, it was not reported publicly by the NST until the very quiet week between Christmas and New Year, with media coverage on 30 December 2025[2]. Noting that the NST publishes determinations where the parties agree or where the decision sets a precedent, all of which may have taken some time to settle, delayed transparency has consequences regardless of the reasons:
it heightens reputational impact; and
it fuels perceptions of governance fragility.
As integrity systems mature, timeliness and transparency in outcomes will increasingly shape public trust — not just the substance of decisions themselves.
Conclusion
Belooussov v Gymnastics Australia is a warning and a lesson. Integrity in sport is no longer just about internal compliance — it is a legal risk discipline. Australian sport now operates in an environment where:
integrity decisions are legal decisions;
investigations are only one part of the risk equation; and
governance credibility depends on defensible outcomes.
Sport does not need less integrity. It needs integrity systems designed with legal scrutiny in mind. Boards, CEOs, and integrity professionals must invest in:
early legal involvement;
investigation frameworks designed for arbitration;
training for dispute resolution, not just investigation; and
procedural and evidence rigor as part of culture, not just compliance.
Good intentions and subjective applications of policies are no longer enough. Sport requires integrity systems designed to withstand legal challenge while promoting strong integrity culture and protecting all participants.
To discuss your sport’s integrity program, contact me here or here.
(Updated 25 March 2026)
[1]https://www.nationalsportstribunal.gov.au/sites/default/files/2025-12/determination-olga-belooussov-v-gymnastics-australia-nste24331101-december-2025-pdf.pdf
