National governance reform makes sense. That doesn't mean the members have to surrender their rights.
For some time now, Australian sport has been encouraged to modernise its governance structures. The Australian Sports Commission (ASC) has consistently promoted more effective national alignment, stronger boards, improved accountability and better use of resources across sporting organisations. The rationale is not difficult to understand.
Australia's traditional federated sporting structures can be complicated, expensive and occasionally dysfunctional. An NSO and its state member organisations may share responsibility for participation, high performance, commercial development, policy implementation and governance — often with competing priorities and limited resources. In some sports, this results in unnecessary duplication, inefficiency and, at times, outright conflict.
Surely one nationally aligned sporting organisation would operate more effectively? Perhaps.
But there is a fundamental governance question that can be overlooked in the pursuit of structural reform:
Who actually owns the sport, and who has the legal right to decide how it is governed?
1. Federated versus unitary governance
Most traditional Australian sports operate through a federated model.
An NSO is generally responsible for national administration, while separately constituted state and territory organisations manage the sport within their respective jurisdictions. These state organisations are often voting members of the NSO.
Importantly, they are not simply branch offices of the national body. They may be separately incorporated legal entities, with their own members, constitutions, boards, assets, employees and legal obligations.
A unitary model, by comparison, seeks to consolidate governance and, potentially, operations under a single national structure. There are obvious potential benefits:
clearer national strategy and accountability;
reduced administrative duplication;
consistent policies and operating procedures;
improved commercial coordination;
more efficient use of scarce resources; and
better oversight of risk and integrity.
However, it is important to distinguish genuine national alignment from compulsory structural centralisation. They are not necessarily the same thing.
The ASC's 2026 Sport Governance Standards recognise the importance of collaboration between constitutionally linked organisations, including the co-design of roles and responsibilities and the alignment of resources. That is not the same as requiring every sport to adopt one particular corporate structure.
2. The inconvenient matter of members' rights
Here is where governance reform can become legally complicated.
An NSO incorporated as a company limited by guarantee is subject to the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), together with its constitution. Under section 140, the constitution generally operates as a statutory contract between the company and its members, and between members in the relevant respects. Those rights cannot simply be disregarded because a national board believes another governance model would be preferable.
Section 136 ordinarily requires a special resolution to amend a company's constitution, subject to any additional constitutional requirements and applicable law. A special resolution generally requires at least 75% support from votes cast by eligible members.
Consider a national sport with eight (8) state and territory members.
The national board concludes that the current federated model is inefficient and proposes to replace it with a new structure that substantially reduces the members' control over national governance.
Those members may well be entitled to vote on whether the proposed constitutional changes should proceed.
In other words, the entities whose powers and rights the reform seeks to change may be the very entities required to approve it.
This is not a legal inconvenience that can be solved by describing the reform as 'best practice'. It is part of the legal architecture of the organisation.
There may also be separate legal considerations concerning the constitutions of state organisations, their members, contractual arrangements, assets, regulatory obligations and the duties of their directors.
And while an NSO board may genuinely believe a unitary model is in the organisation's best interests, directors must continue to discharge their duties to the company. Those duties do not disappear because reform is difficult.
3. Good governance is not simply efficient governance
There is another issue here. Efficiency is an important governance objective, but it is not the only one.
Good governance also requires:
accountability;
transparency;
appropriate stakeholder representation;
clear decision-making powers;
the management of conflicts of interest; and
mechanisms to prevent excessive concentrations of power.
Centralisation may reduce duplication, but it can also reduce opportunities for members and stakeholders to hold national decision-makers accountable. A nationally appointed board may bring considerable professional expertise. However, professional capability and democratic accountability are not mutually exclusive.
A sport that removes member participation without establishing suitable alternative accountability arrangements may simply exchange one governance problem for another. A national structure is not necessarily better governed because fewer people have a vote.
4. Reforming the sport, not merely the constitution
None of this is an argument against unitary governance.
For some sports, particularly those with limited resources, duplicated administration or significant structural dysfunction, it may be the most appropriate model. But the decision should be evidence-based, legally sound and properly supported by affected stakeholders.
There are also alternatives to wholesale restructuring. Sports can improve national alignment through other approaches, such as ‘hybrid’ or ‘shared service’ models, involving:
shared corporate and administrative services;
nationally consistent integrity and safeguarding arrangements;
coordinated commercial strategies;
clearer constitutional powers and delegations;
common technology, reporting and financial systems; and
binding national agreements allocating responsibilities between governing bodies.
Some of these reforms can deliver substantial operational benefits without fundamentally altering the corporate structure of the sport. Others may provide a practical transition towards a more integrated model.
The point is that governance reform should begin with the problem the organisation is trying to solve, rather than an assumption about the structure it should adopt.
5. Who is reform really for?
Before embarking on a major governance restructure, boards should be able to answer several questions.
What is demonstrably wrong with the existing model?
What outcomes will reform deliver for the sport and its participants?
Who gains decision-making power, and who loses it?
What legal rights must be respected?
And, perhaps most importantly, will the proposed reform improve accountability and organisational performance, or merely centralise control?
The future of Australian sports governance should involve modern, efficient and professionally managed organisations. But it must also respect the legal and democratic foundations on which many of those organisations were established.
One sport, one voice may be a worthwhile aspiration. But good governance also requires asking who gets to speak, who gets to decide, and who holds the decision-makers accountable.
That is a more difficult conversation than simply rewriting a constitution. It is also a more important one.
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