Australia is finally moving towards national match-fixing offences. But criminalisation is only one part of protecting sport.
After years of reviews, policy commitments and legislative discussion, Australia is finally taking a significant step towards a national criminal law response to match-fixing and sporting corruption.
On 20 August 2026, the Commonwealth Government introduced the Criminal Code Amendment (National Sport Integrity Offences) Bill 2026. The Bill proposes seven (7) new criminal offences targeting the corruption of sporting competitions, the misuse of inside information, and related conduct.
The Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee reported on 2 October 2026, recommending that the Bill be passed without amendment.
The reform is long overdue. But will criminalising match-fixing actually stop it?
Not on its own.
1. Why the new laws matter
Australia already has laws addressing match-fixing and betting-related corruption in several states and territories.
However, their coverage is not uniform. Some offences are closely connected to betting, while others address broader forms of corrupt conduct.
That creates difficulties in an environment where sporting competitions, participants, wagering markets and criminal organisations routinely operate across jurisdictional boundaries.
The proposed Commonwealth offences seek to establish a more consistent national response.
The Bill targets seven (7) categories of conduct:
Corrupting a sporting event.
Inducing the corruption of a sporting event (including esports events).
Soliciting corruption of a sporting event.
Altering, destroying or concealing corrupt conduct information.
Using or communicating corrupt conduct information.
Possessing corrupt conduct information with intent to use or communicate it.
Using or communicating inside information.
The proposed maximum penalties range from three (3) to 10 years' imprisonment, depending on the offence.
Importantly, the offences are not exclusively concerned with betting. The Bill recognises that sporting corruption can involve improperly influencing the outcome of a competition for a benefit, or to cause or avoid a detriment, even where no wager has been placed.
Subject to the elements and jurisdictional requirements of the relevant offence, an attempt to corrupt an event need not ultimately succeed before criminal liability can arise.
That is a meaningful development.
2. Sport does not stop at Australia's borders
The proposed laws are particularly relevant to the increasingly international nature of sport.
Consider an esports competition conducted in Australia involving overseas teams, an international tournament organiser, a foreign game publisher, and betting activity occurring through offshore operators. Or a lower-tier sporting competition attracting wagering interest from markets located well outside Australia. The conduct may occur in Australia, but relevant betting accounts, communications, financial transactions and participants may be located elsewhere.
Australia's criminal laws can play an important role in addressing these threats, but the Commonwealth does not possess an unrestricted constitutional power to regulate every sporting competition. The Bill therefore relies on connections to recognised Commonwealth legislative powers, including corporations, trade and commerce, communications and other constitutional foundations.
Its international reach is also subject to particular legislative conditions. Some additional provisions depend on Australia's eventual ratification of, and the commencement for Australia of, the Council of Europe's Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competitions — commonly known as the Macolin Convention.
Australia signed the Convention in 2019 but has not yet ratified it.
This illustrates an important point. National legislation is necessary, but sporting corruption is an international problem requiring international cooperation.
3. Criminal law is not an integrity program
Here is where sporting organisations need to be careful.
It would be a mistake to regard the proposed national offences as relieving sports of responsibility for preventing competition manipulation.
Criminal law is primarily an enforcement mechanism. It does not, by itself, provide the education, monitoring, reporting channels, internal disciplinary processes and safeguarding measures needed to prevent corruption. Nor does it eliminate the significant evidentiary challenges involved in investigating suspicious sporting conduct.
Sporting organisations should already be considering:
whether their competition manipulation policies apply to all relevant participants, officials and support personnel;
what inside information those people can access and how it is controlled;
whether participants understand their betting and reporting obligations;
how suspicious activity is identified, documented and escalated;
what information-sharing arrangements exist with integrity agencies, wagering operators and law enforcement; and
whether appropriate contractual powers and disciplinary processes are available.
A sporting organisation may also need to respond to suspected corruption before a criminal investigation is completed via its own sporting remedies as set out under the relevant organisation’s constitution, by-laws, and/or policies (including codes of conduct), as validly incorporated into its contractual frameworks with its participants. Appropriate interim measures, contractual restrictions and disciplinary proceedings may be available, but they must be exercised lawfully and consistently with procedural fairness, including so as to not prejudice any court proceedings on foot.
Of course, criminal proceedings and sporting disciplinary proceedings operate under different rules and standards (including standards of proof). One should not be confused with the other.
4. The betting market is changing faster than regulation
There is another developing issue that sport should not underestimate.
Traditional wagering regulation assumes that identifiable, licensed betting operators can be required to cooperate with sporting bodies, provide information and comply with relevant integrity obligations. But emerging offshore betting and prediction markets challenge that assumption.
Where bets or event-related financial positions are traded through overseas platforms outside Australia's domestic licensing arrangements, the visibility available to Australian sporting organisations and regulators may be substantially reduced.
Recent reporting in October 2026 concerning prediction markets and Australian sporting events demonstrates why this issue deserves attention. These markets may present new opportunities for exploitation of inside information and manipulation of lower-profile competitions, including those that have historically attracted little regulated wagering interest.
The proposed Commonwealth criminal offences provide an additional means of pursuing corrupt conduct where their legal requirements are satisfied. They do not, however, themselves establish a comprehensive regulatory framework for offshore prediction markets, compel every foreign operator to cooperate, or resolve the practical difficulties of cross-border investigation.
That distinction matters.
5. The next step belongs to sport
The proposed legislation is an important and welcome reform.
It responds to longstanding recommendations, including those made by the 2018 Wood Review, and brings Australia closer to a more coordinated national and international response to sports corruption. But criminalisation should be seen as an additional layer of protection, not a substitute for effective integrity governance.
The most effective response will combine clear and enforceable sporting rules, education, early identification of threats, intelligence-sharing, proportionate disciplinary action and criminal enforcement where appropriate.
There also needs to be a better understanding of the commercial and technological environment in which competitions now operate. That includes recognising that esports and traditional sport may face similar corruption threats, while operating through very different regulatory and commercial structures.
For boards and executives, the question is not simply whether the police can prosecute a match-fixer. It is:
whether their organisation has established an integrity environment that makes corruption more difficult, detects warning signs earlier, and responds effectively when concerns arise.
You cannot fix a fixed match with a policy alone. And you cannot prevent match-fixing with criminal law alone, either. Both need to form part of a credible, coordinated integrity system.
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